Wittgenstein’s treatment of mind in the second half of the Investigations (from PI §243 to the end) can be seen to parallel his treatment of language and meaning. As we shall see in the first section, the argument known as “the private language argument” (PI §§243-315) explicitly invokes the early critique of the representationalist theory of language by questioning the use of ostension in fixing the meaning of sensation-terms. This idea that ostension can fix reference is essential to the private language argument. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 3, the apparent success of ab initio baptism is the result of conflating ostensive training and ostensive definition. This conflation makes it seem that semantic norms can be derived from nothing more than an articulate sound’s or mark’s being in physical proximity to an object. But no norm, no paradigm judgment, no exemplary object can be squeezed from this combination. Recognition of this mistake domesticates reference, alerting us to the stage-setting that is required for any ostensive definition to succeed. Reminders are appropriate devices for bringing home this point. But a philosopher who is committed to a representationalist picture of the relation of thought to the world looks for a set of special names and special objects that realize the kind of connection he thinks necessary for semantic relations to exist at all. Wittgenstein’s examination of this strategy is linked to the problem of consciousness, the third problem of normative similarity: the conditions of identity and reidentification for states of consciousness, exemplified in the occurrence of sensations.