Implications for policy

Before elaborating on the implications of this research for counter-terrorism policies, the empirical results shall be briefly re-summarized. Four cases served to depict the transformation of a terrorist group as a reaction to selective/collective concessions and the resulting effects thereof on another group with either similar or competing motivations. The first two case studies focused on effects of selective/collective concessions on other groups with motivations similar to those groups directly receiving concessions. In the first Egyptian case, it is noteworthy that albeit all three groups – the Jama’ah Islamiya, the Egyptian Jihad and al-Qaeda – started as groups with similar ambitions, the Jama’ah Islamiya’s change of means and the diverging reactions of Jihad and al-Qaeda turned previous allies into fierce competitors. Thus, the reactions of the Egyptian Jihad and al-Qaeda to the Jama’ah’s revisions were very different from one another. In fact, a split occurred within the ranks of the Egyptian Jihad with members of the group joining the newly founded al-Qaeda. What can be gleaned from this case study is that selective concessions – here in forms of prisoner release – reconfirmed those who perceived the Jama’ah’s change of mind as a failure to be avoided and further radicalized by innovation in terms of terrorism to do the opposite of what led to this failure – renouncing terrorism. Clearly, al-Qaeda perceived the selective concessions as a fatal mistake to be prevented. Quite contrarily, the collective concessions that accrued to the Jama’ah’s reconfirmed those who wanted to copy the Jama’ah Islamiya and equally transform. The Jama’ah Islamiya gained collective concessions in the form of impact on the global Islamic movement. Clearly, the Egyptian Jihad understood that collective benefits were achieved through the Jama’ah Islamiya’s renunciation of violence. While all three groups had comparable motivations and a similar enemy picture of Israel and the West’s clients states, the reaction of al-Qaeda in the direction of radicalizing its ends toward the far enemy doctrine turned it into a competitor of the Jama’ah and of Jihad. Thus, groups previously similar in their ambitions turned into competitors. In the case on the Middle Eastern conflict, a similar development can be

same ends. Thus, when Hamas issued its Charter in 1988, Article 27 of that charter refers to the PLO as “father, brother, relative or a friend” and explicitly states that the two share the same burden, have the same enemy and share a common destiny.1 It was in the wake of the Oslo Accords and the PLO’s recognition of Israel that the two groups increasingly turned into competitors. However, Hamas’ reaction was ambiguous at best. The outlook for collective concessions in the form of promised autonomy, freedom of movement and a freeze on settlement-building had spurred hopes and motivated Hamas to exhibit copycat behavior. Hamas recognized the opportunity for a change and – just like the PLO – adapted its ends by offering a truce to Israel for the first time, thereby implicitly recognizing Israel. The group sent signals of its will to seek a compromise with the PLO and Israel, being furthermore aware of the popular will and the need to act more pragmatically. Collective concessions, especially if they were to be implemented, would have decisively undermined the group’s radicalization and its attempts at derailing the peace process. However, the increasing perception within the Palestinian population of the PLO as the sole profiteer of Oslo neatly played into Hamas’ hands. Israel’s selective concessions, which for the most part only seemed to apply to members of the PLO, were perceived by Hamas as a fatal mistake to be avoided. Instead, Hamas sought to innovate in terms of terrorism to do the opposite of what led to this mistake – transformation (as it was carried out by the PLO). It can thus be observed that selective concessions in the form of benefits to one group would factor into another group’s radicalization if it is motivated by a similar ambition, i.e. by facing the same enemy (here: Israel), as it perceives the fellow’s weakness in giving in as a failure to be avoided. In order to achieve this, Hamas innovated by introducing suicide bombings. The group’s radicalization thereby came along with an increasing competition with the PLO. Indeed, the PLO and Hamas continued to divide ever further over the question of their different ends. While the first two case studies focused on effects of selective/collective concessions on other groups with similar motivations, the second two case studies focused on effects of selective/collective concessions on other groups with competing motivations. In the Colombian case, it is noteworthy to observe that the guerrilla group ELN increasingly comes to resemble its former archenemy – the paramilitaries – as a consequence of its copying of the paramilitaries’ terrorism. It was only in the beginning that the ELN reacted with an innovation pattern to the paramilitaries’ change of means. The ELN wanted to negotiate with the government but on substantially different terms to the paramilitaries. The group’s main interest was to make the negotiations a political process and to transform themselves into a political party. Their attempt to engage with civil society can be seen in this context. The ELN had made it clear from the beginning “that negotiating with her means including the civil society.”2 The group’s attempt to differentiate its own dialogue process from the one between the Colombian government and the paramilitaries can be regarded as an innovation attempt in order to avoid the failure of selective concessions, yet to do the opposite of what led to that failure – the paramilitaries’

talks between the ELN and the Colombian government were not to last and are currently not continuing. Instead, in May 2008 the ELN wrote a letter to the FARC secretariat proposing cooperation. The ELN perceives the state and the paramilitaries as the true terrorists: “terror does not leave free expression for those who oppose the regime . . .”3 Clearly, the state, with its dealings with the paramilitaries, has a stake in the ELN’s recent choice in continuing the struggle. While the initial selective concessions to the paramilitaries seemed to have provided some security and incentives for the ELN to also seek dialogue, the government does not allow this dialogue to be a political process. Thus, the government is in fact making a collective concession to the paramilitaries, whose broader ends aim to defend the status quo. With the prevention of a political process, the Colombian government maintains the status quo. These collective concessions to the paramilitaries motivated the ELN to copy the paramilitaries’ terrorism. Ironically, the ELN – which is forced to involve itself in drug-trafficking if it keeps fighting – will come to resemble its archenemy – the paramilitaries, who were infamous for drug involvement. The group therewith comes to copy the means of its former competitor. This is comprehensible when interpreting the ELN’s move as an attempt to copy what led to the success of collective concessions – the paramilitaries’ terrorism. The ELN’s radicalization – spurred by the government, which is making collective concessions to the paramilitaries by maintaining the status quo and not allowing a political process – implies that the group increasingly resembles the paramilitaries. Also in the case of Turkey, the reaction of the Turkish Hezbollah to the PKK’s change of ends as a consequence of collective concessions reveals a copycat pattern which implies that the Turkish Hezbollah increasingly resembles its former competitor. The alleged state-sponsored “Frankenstein’s monster” turned against its apparent creator – the Turkish state – when cooperation became dispensable. Essentially “left without a job,” the Turkish Hezbollah turned against the state and moved westward. This move can be interpreted with the Turkish Hezbollah’s perception of the PKK terrorism as successful in achieving collective concessions: if the PKK gained through its fight against the state, its terrorist behavior must be a job worthy of imitating. After all, fighting the government seemed now more promising that actually cooperating with it. Interestingly, by copying the ends of its former archenemy, the Turkish Hezbollah thus came to resemble the previous PKK. Whereas the PKK had fought against the state, the new security threat to Turkey was now the Turkish Hezbollah. The empirical results are simplified in Table 7.1. These findings reveal two distinct, yet interacting, patterns: innovation versus copycat behavior and radicalization versus de-radicalization.