How should we weigh up the responsibilities we have towards compatriots and non-compatriots respectively? Even the staunchest advocates of statist views cannot believe that non-compatriots count for nothing. If one came across a small child drowning in a pond in a so-called “easy rescue case,” one would have a responsibility to perform the life-saving act of pulling the child to safety, no matter whether the child was a compatriot or not (Singer 1972: 229-43). We have some basic responsibilities towards everyone, irrespective of their citizenship. However, it seems equally clear, to some at least, that in certain kinds of matters we may defensibly favor the interests of our compatriots, typically in decisions concerning the distribution of resources (Miller 2000; Tamir 1993; Rawls 1999b). In defense of such decisions it is frequently claimed that the connections between compatriots are stronger and of the right kind to generate more demanding obligations of justice (Miller 1998: 202-24; Blake 2002: 257-96; Hurka 1997: 139-57). For instance, because we cooperate in a shared institutional order from which we derive significant benefits, we owe compatriots more concern (Miller 1998). While these might constitute one set of relevant relations, there are other relevant considerations which suggest that we1 are, in fact, more connected to non-compatriots – in the sense of being more responsible for their plight – than we might like to believe. One such way, explored in this chapter, involves making it difficult for them to achieve justice in their internal affairs. As a case study of this phenomenon, in this chapter I explore issues of health in developing countries and our global responsibilities.2 As we will come to see, this gives us a better sense of how we can think more concretely about how to weigh up responsibilities to compatriots and non-compatriots. There is a further advantage to this kind of more fine-grained discussion of some actual public policy issues. So far discussion of obligations to compatriots and non-compatriots has been conducted at a fairly abstract level, and lacks specificity with respect to what exactly our obligations to compatriots or noncompatriots are in a particular domain. By examining particular issues we get a richer sense of what is possible and what kinds of considerations might be relevant. This kind of analysis can then in turn better inform our theoretical views.