One of my main aims in this book is to subject several views that claim the name pluralism to philosophical criticism. Although I will eventually present a positive thesis about how we should understand value and liberalism, a sizeable portion of the book is devoted to the negative claim that we should decline to accept pluralism in its most distinctive varieties. I have come to learn in the course of developing my views on this matter that people tend to assume that in not embracing pluralism, one thereby commits to something pernicious, such as a view which values conformity, despises diversity, prizes orderliness, demands consensus, shuns difference, squelches discord, stifl es creativity, and disables spontaneity. In the minds of many, pluralism is intrinsically tied to tolerance, open-mindedness, diversity, civility, and many other good things. The suggestion that we should resist pluralism, then, is taken as a call for rejecting tolerance, imposing homogeneity, and closing minds. The typical response to such a suggestion is understandably hostile and indignant. Arguments against pluralism are heard as arguments in favor of intolerance and conformism. Who would want to defend such things? Not I. Accordingly, I have learned to tread lightly. Before beginning in earnest, then, I must dispel the view that those who caution against adopting pluralism thereby adopt such pernicious views.