T he problem of action and other nonverbal behavior i n psychoanaly-sis was initially related to the m i n d - b o d y problem as it was con-strued i n drive theory The body was understood mult idimensional ly by Freud (1905a, 1915b, 1920, 1923) as a material reality, as the source of mental life, as a m e d i u m for symbolic representation of mental life, and as the object of its o w n drive for satisfaction (autoplastic activity and narcissism). Freud's posi t ion was paradoxical . W h i l e he took a materialist posit ion on the m i n d - b o d y problem-that m i n d is ultimately body-he also retained the Greek and Cartesian conception about the separateness of m i n d and body. The concept of drive was designed as a bridge between the worlds of m i n d and of body: drive refers both to an aspect of the process of somatic excitation and to somatic excitation's representative i n the psyche. This psychic representation has four parts: a quantitative intensity factor (pressure), a qualitative def ining factor (coming from the somatic source), an a im and an object that are quite variable and contingent (Freud, 1905a). Freud's concepts of drive and instinct, the pleasure pr inciple , the reality pr inc iple , and the compuls ion to repeat underlie the way i n w h i c h action was construed and posed as a technical problem for the analyst. The idea that mental activity, especially thoughtful verbalization, can take place only w h e n action is inhibited (the rule of abstinence) comes f rom Freud's extension of these distinctions and definitions i n a theory of thought as a derivative of bodily experience, especially sexual.