Two views about the nature of reality In the introduction, we noted the opposition between a traditional conception of metaphysics as the characterization of being qua being and a more modern conception that takes metaphysics to be concerned with the characterization of human conceptual structures. As we saw, those who endorse the latter view reject the traditional conception of metaphysics because they think it presupposes that it is possible for us to have access to a reality that exists independently of our means of conceptualizing or knowing it, and they deny that this is possible. As they see it, the best that metaphysicians can do is to identify and describe things as they get conceptualized by us – to study, as we put it, our conceptual scheme or schemes. What this suggests, we said, is that the opposition between these two conceptions of metaphysics is rooted in a deeper opposition - one bearing on the relationship between our thought/language and the world. We tentatively endorsed the traditional conception of metaphysics; but we conceded that the underlying issue of the relationship between thought and the world is one we needed to address. I promised that we would confront the issue in the concluding chapter; and that is where we are now.