When Bernard Williams fi rst introduced the idea of the truth-aim, it was the fi rst of fi ve features discussed to illuminate the nature of belief, and to show “how far, if at all, believing something can be related to decision and will.” Williams actually says of this fi rst feature that it can be “roughly summarized” or “vaguely summed up” as “beliefs aim at truth.” 1 His employment of the truth-aim in an argument for why we cannot believe at will is as follows: If truth is the aim of belief, any states that I can achieve at will would not recognizably be beliefs. For if what I believe were up to me, seemingly, I could form a belief regardless of whether I thought it true-but if I knew this, then I would know that there is no reason to think that this “belief” accurately represents reality. But if to have a belief is to be committed to its truth, then believing entails viewing the belief as representing reality. Believing at will is, thus, incoherent, because it entails one viewing a belief as 1) necessarily representing reality and 2) not necessarily representing reality. Thus, believing at will is not only a psychological impossibility, but the very concept of belief also renders the idea incoherent.