ABSTRACT

WE are now ready to proceed further with the a posteriori definition of the religious Object. We have already seen how good God is; we have now to inquire how great he is. Here again our dependence may be upon anyone or upon all three of the following procedures: (1) intuition, arising out of vital religious experience, and sufficiently criticized by means of logical and further experiential tests; (2) postulates, imperative for the practical life, taken as working hypotheses and verified sufficiently for all valid practical purposes; (3) theoretical construction, to account for empirical laws, on the principle that we may learn something of what a thing is from what it does.

~rhe term "metaphysical attributes" must not be taken, therefore, as implying any "high and dry" metaphysical method of arriving at our conclusions; on the contrary what we are to attempt is to express, without inner contradiction or conflict with established fact, the view of the greatness of God which seems to be involved in the cognitive aspects of experimental religion when it is at its best spiritually, and more particularly, in the laws of empirical theology. The customary term, "metaphysical," is not inappropriate here, however, inasmuch as what is to be asserted would, in our philosophy of religion, be offered as helping to constitute an hypothesis for a fundamentally empirical metaphysic.