THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE: THE DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE For most of the fifties, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union had been dominated by the development of nuclear bombs and bombers. This meant that the polar regions were of great strategic importance, and resulted on the American side in the development of a radar network. The introduction of the intercontinental missile, which was not strictly limited to a course over the Pole, reduced this strategic interest, although the danger of a bomber attack still remained. But a new range of possibilities surfaced when, in 1958, the nuclear submarine Nautilus navigated under the icecap to the North Pole. This indicated that nuclear submarines could launch their missiles from near the Siberian coast. Under these circumstances a legal doctrine was needed that could prevent foreign naval vessels from approaching the Siberian coast. The question of sovereignty attracted fresh attention, as can be seen in the 1960 Law on the Soviet Borders. Technically this law, which mentioned historic seas and straits, was nothing but a ratification of the results of the Geneva conference, although 'Geneva' had reached no conclusion about historic bays. The 1960 law was a clear signal, without causing a legal controversy about the Siberian seas.