ABSTRACT
Like anger and disgust, shame and guilt form a pair of related negative moral emotions. They each involve the condemnation of the self, or something identifi ed with the self, rather than the condemnation of others. Both guilt and shame are also often triggered by violations of moral norms. While disgust’s status as an emotion has been subjected to doubt because it seems too concrete and sensory a reaction (Royzman & Sabini, 2001), guilt has been doubted for the opposite reason: it seems too cognitive, a metaphor or judgment rather than a true emotion (Sabini & Silver, 1997). These authors, on the other hand, propose that shame is the true emotion behind feelings of guilt. In keeping with shame’s more solid status, it has been proposed as a basic emotion (Elison, 2005), has stronger characteristic bodily sensations (Roseman et al., 1994), and has its own facial and full-body expressions (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009b). Shame, too, has a name that only refers to a feeling, while “guilt” or “guilty” can refer to an emotionless judgment about responsibility for a bad act. At the same time, terms for the two emotions are semantically very close (Shaver et al., 1987). “Guilt” and “shame” are often mentioned in the same phrase, or confused with each other.
