ABSTRACT
While some of these views are generally valid, most are overhasty simplifications that warrant further examination; while a few are politically motivated clichés that should be refuted before they coalesce into a selfdefeating creed among transatlantic observers and policy-makers. Major historical events are rarely the unmitigated watersheds that historical analysis makes them out to be after the fact. Nor do they often bring to light mono-dimensional underlying trends. Thus, it is an exaggeration to claim that 9/11 simply lifted a veil on monolithic American and European perceptions of risk, or their unmitigated divergence. Reactions to the tragedy rather hinted at the coexistence of ambivalent instincts on both sides of the Atlantic. What is true is that 9/11 and the Iraq crisis soon caused both sides to rally around a caricatural and vociferous version of its strategic outlook, which each turned into a weapon against the other. These were not the best, but the worst of times to characterize transatlantic threat perceptions with broad strokes. Failing to appreciate this complexity, observers at the time produced simplistic interpretations that soon devolved into paradoxical nonsense. Thus we are told that the process of European integration has caused the Old World’s elites and publics to lose sight of international risk altogether.
