ABSTRACT
Can there be such a thing as an “ethical” cyberwar, fought in compliance with the conventional principles of just war theory? Especially given that political leaders in the U.S., U.K., Australia, and major European NATO countries all unanimously and persistently report that they are already under relentless cyber attack,1 one might reasonably wonder, instead, whether it even makes sense to talk about “ethics,” morality or possible legal constraints on our behavior in the development and use of cyberweapons, or engaging in cyberwarfare. How, then, can we meaningfully speak of ethics, law, and just war concepts when adversary nations, organized crime, and terrorists are relentlessly engaged in attacking us, harming us, and stealing us blind without regard for those concepts? The vulnerabilities, the threats posed, and the genuine harm already done are all very real. Would not a consideration of ethics or legal governance at this point merely serve merely to hamper us with constraints on our ability to respond to these vulnerabilities, and advantage adversaries who give such matters absolutely no credence whatsoever? Nevertheless, I want to argue that we and our potential adversaries would derive considerable advantage by giving some thought to governance in both morality and the law, in that it encourages all concerned to reflect more cogently upon strategic goals that might be served by cyber conflict. An “ethical analysis” of cyber conflict invites all parties to it to think clearly about what we are doing, what we are willing (and perhaps unwilling) to do, and why. I think that it is therefore appropriate and important to talk about what we ourselves in places like the U.S., the U.K, Europe, and Australia can and should do in response to what appear to be a relentless barrage of espionage and cyber attacks directed against military, commercial, and vital infrastructure targets in our nation by persons or entities unknown. We must also consider whether there are limits (of an ethical sort) on what we are willing to do, and finally about whether, just as in conventional or counterinsurgency conflicts, it is really true that acknowledging and abiding by such limits automatically puts us at a disadvantage in our conflict with adversaries and criminals.2
