ABSTRACT
The idea that “innocent” noncombatants are deserving of immunity from attack is emotionally comforting, after all, no one wants to think that those who fight on their behalf would intentionally kill or maim those who are undeserving of such a fate. But noncombatant immunity is a big assumption, premised on the interpretation of noncombatants as innocent qua harmless. However, an analysis of this claim quickly shows that while on a prima facie level noncombatants deserve immunity from attack, this status needs to be justified not just on the basis of innocence qua harmless, but on the basis of innocence qua blameless as well. The results of such an analysis reveal that, in principle, noncombatants are not always as innocent qua harmless as they appear, and rarely are they innocent qua blameless. Thus, subject to a variety of contingent factors, their right to immunity from attack is significantly eroded or collapses altogether. A successful re-evaluation of noncombatant claims to immunity from attack has a profound impact on discussions of terrorism, for in many asymmetrical conflicts the smaller party is labeled terrorist precisely because of the noncombatant casualties they generate. In light of the in principle moral justification of noncombatant deaths, other criteria must be used to distinguish when noncombatants can be legitimately targeted, namely when doing so is a justifiable part of an asymmetric conflict, and when it is unjustifiable and therefore an act of terrorism. The criteria of just cause, supreme emergency, legitimate authority, the use of violence as a last resort, and that the violence employed has a reasonable chance of success can accomplish this.
