ABSTRACT
In October 1956, Anglo-French military forces intervened in Egypt in an attempt to overthrow the government of Abdel Gamel Nasser. The intervention came in response to the Nasser government’s ongoing support of Algerian rebels, its increasing ties to the Soviet Union, and its nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 27 July 1956. Consistent with the prudential restraint model, although British and French policy-makers believed that the nationalization might provide a legal basis for undertaking military action against Egypt, they delayed the implementation of such action out of concern that other states would perceive the United Kingdom and France as aggressors and respond with resistance to them. Facing resistance in the Security Council and elsewhere, British and French policymakers relied on an Israeli invasion of Egypt to provide a legal pretext for direct military intervention and confined the operation to the Suez Canal Zone. These changes to the manner and timing of their military actions led to the failure of their attempt to overthrow the Nasser government and contributed to the decline of their influence in the Middle East region.
