ABSTRACT
Colin McGinn’s book Wittgenstein on Meaning (1984) is meant as an answer to Kripke’s sceptical challenge, and a criticism of the sociological or collectivist position Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. According to McGinn, Wittgenstein did not develop a sceptical argument about rules, and he did not endorse a sociological account of rule following, either in the form attributed to him by Kripke or in any variant of it. On the contrary, says McGinn, Wittgenstein was an individualist, and offered an individualist account of rule following. Although on occasion identifying short-comings in Wittgenstein’s treatment of these themes, McGinn endorses what he sees as Wittgenstein’s individualist approach:
My own view is that rule-following may be conceived, as I think it is pre-theoretically, in entirely individualistic terms. I should emphasise that I do not believe that Wittgenstein himself would have dissented from this conclusion: insofar as he has a view on the individual/social opposition, he is an individualist… (M: 200).
