In studying this, we must not only concern ourselves with the frontline soldier, who up until now has been under the heaviest pressure. If we think of the Russians who in Stalingrad crossed the Volga under enemy fire, or of the parachutists who in Cassino had to withstand overhead bombardments for hours and hours, then we must ask ourselves if it is possible to bear even greater suffering. From now on, the support troops of all kinds will have to be considered as well. In a future war they will perhaps also be more highly involved than hitherto, and their importance as to the outcome of a future battle may be increased. With regard to the possible scenarios of future wars, a range of possibilities is in store for the soldiers of European countries. Basically the following possibilities exist. They may arise individually, simultaneously or consecutively. Because of its horrifying effects for everyone, 'total war' between the Warsaw Pact and NATO must be considered first. The result would be mass armies, weapons with effects which have never been experienced before, or are so far unknown: especially chemical, nuclear, and perhaps biological weapons. The civilian population would be heavily involved. All countries would make full use of the mobility of their troops. Hence there would be no static or even stable front. Some countries would be quickly overrun with serious future consequences. In general a relatively short war of days or at most a few weeks is expected. Much of this picture may be wrong. The use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is not inevitable. Mobile warfare may remain the dream of those responsible for teaching tactics. The duration of the war cannot really be forecast, even if one considers

The recognizable consequences of a future war which lie within our consideration are the use of mass armies, the large increase in numbers of weapons and their effects, the involvement of practically all the soldiers and many civilians in the fighting, and the possible break-up of connected military fronts. A second conceivable scenario is an attack by the Warsaw Pact on a single NATO country, with the objective of occupying it. This could be done by making use of a period of weakness in the Alliance, and by simultaneously giving security guarantees to any country not directly involved whether it be inside or outside NATO. Strategists describe this as 'limited war'. As far as the invaded country is concerned the situation would be different from that of the first scenario only in so far as it would have to expect a swifter and more thorough enemy penetration and a shorter war. If the attacker is greatly superior in conventional weapons and if the defending country has no nuclear capability of its own, the probability of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons might be reduced. In studying the pressures involved in this scenario, it is significant that the defending soldiers would very soon face defeat. This may soon convince them that further fighting is not worthwhile. Therefore, the attackers would probably succeed very soon in bringing the defenders to heel.