The abortive uprising in Tibet and the escape of the Dalai Lama over the mountain passes into Assam in 1959 generated tensions between India and China which would have been difficult to imagine a few years earlier in the aftermath of the Bandung Conference. From the Chinese point of view India's version of non-alignment, as portrayed by Nehru, had increasingly become a mere fa~ade be~nd which India was actually opposing socialism and beco;ming the servant of imperialism. To give credible substance to this view, Beijing could point to Indian statements in support of United States intervention in Lebanon in 1958 to 'protect its own interests'; the security treaty 'imposed' on the Japanese people in 1960 and about which Nehru had commented: 'It is not for me to discuss the issue'; the involvement of Indian troops in the Congo, now Zaire. The Chinese were further convinced they were right when Nehru was hailed in Washington as 'a top favourite of the Kennedy administration among statesmen of the world'.