We have seen that reciprocal co-operation (RC) is both substantively and procedurally rational in simple transparent worlds. However it may seem surprising that I propose RC as a solution to the compliance problem. The original compliance dilemma pitted straightforward rationality against morality. Following Gauthier, I used responsive constraints to improve on the rational performance of moral players. But I went further in this direction and, like Frankenstein, ended up with what some will see as a moral monster. Gauthier’s principle, constrained maximization, is recog-nizably moral. In contrast, my principle, reciprocal co-operation, whose distinguishing feature is a willingness to exploit unconditional cooperators (UC), looks morally defective. By showing that rationality directs one to exploit innocent agents, reciprocal co-operators reopen the gap between rationality and morality. Reciprocal cooperators seem to be part of the compliance problem, not part of its solution. In this new compliance dilemma, rationality points to my principle, RC, while morality points to conditional cooperation (CC).