ABSTRACT
Seven years after the signing of the DoP, the institutions of autonomy were still taking root; visibly shooting upward, beneath the surface they were struggling in shallow soil. Limited in terms of territory and autonomy, they were also short of legitimacy. The bureaucracy and security apparatus continued to recruit, co-opt, and coerce in order to broaden, deepen, and otherwise shoreup the social foundations of a national project struggling to extend its reach and deliver results. Within the framework of transition negotiated by the PLO, devoid as it was of legal anchors, an implementation mechanism, or external leverage with teeth, all further expansion of PA territory, autonomy, indeed any forward momentum at all, required Israeli consent. That consent, in the sense that Israel had seized everything and could choose what, when, and how much of it to give back, was increasingly predicated on the PA’s efficacy in policing its own people, still under occupation. The trilateral security model codified in Wye proved a tangible success, with the PA working in effective cooperation with the CIA and Shin Bet.1 However, autonomy for the majority of Palestinians was colored by demands for elusive reform, visibly uneven economic development, accelerated land confiscation, and an unending wait for relatives and friends stuck in jails, most of them run by Israelis, some now by Palestinians. For refugees living in or outside of the camps, resolution appeared distant at best.
