From the discussion of the data-frame approach in Chapter 2, it is possible to consider artefacts as a form of frame, at least in their role as external representation, which contrasts with the internal representation that is held by the sense maker. The question for this chapter is whether it is feasible to consider artefacts not merely as frames but also as agents in sensemaking. In other words, we could simply claim that cognitive artefacts (Norman 1991) provide benefits for individual cognition by allowing people to offload some information rather than having to remember it. However, the nature of cognitive artefacts also allows people to perform some cognitive actions in the world rather than in the head (Norman and Draper 1986). In this chapter, we present the concept of distributed cognition, which argues that cognition cannot be so neatly captured as an individual activity but rather as arising from the interactions between people and their cognitive artefacts. This raises a fundamental philosophical question about when or where cognition occurs and whether it is solely the function

of individual cognition. A distributed cognition approach would be at odds with the individual cognition descriptions in Chapter 4 because it would argue that sensemaking is not solely a matter of the expertise of the individual sense maker but also emerges from the interaction between the person and the artefacts that they use. In this way, the argument relates to the discussion of common ground in Chapter 1 in that sense arises from the interaction between people and artefacts.