ABSTRACT
Borders have always been integral to discourses of international security and world politics. Predictions of a borderless world and a dustbin of history overflowing with the stalwarts of modernity were quickly recognized to be little more than the over-zealous Zeitgeist born of a post1989 hangover (see Ohmae 1999; Fukuyama 1992; Friedman 1999; Beilharz et al. 1992; Salter 2002). The state and indeed international frontiers have proven to be far more resilient than such commentaries predicted. As the process of European integration once again found its feet, the rhetoric of freer movement and the eradication of borders only vaguely cloaked dominant preoccupations with constructing a ‘Fortress Europe’ (Walters 2002; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Borneman 1998; Pieterse 1991). In fact, even before the events of 11 September 2001, some analysts argued for the critical importance of ‘identities, borders, orders’ as an integral triad in contemporary international relations theory (Albert et al. 2001; Wilson and Donnan 1998). The politics of identities, borders and orders has nonetheless changed. Notably, the hours and days immediately following the horrific events of September 11 reminded us that sacrificing the unfettered movement of capital, goods and services at the altar of security was no option; a long-term solution for ‘managing’ identities, borders and orders was essential (Carr 2002; Andreas and Biersteker 2003). As if it were privy to
some prophecy, the biometrics industry seemed immediately ubiquitous, claiming to provide all the right answers for the ‘new’ challenges of the global security environment.
