ABSTRACT
Philosophers during the enlightenment generally assumed that emotions contaminate reason, and that the proper goal of human intelligence is to elevate us above our animal passions. By contrast, current psychologists are beginning to depart from traditional views by entertaining such concepts as “emotional intelligence” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). In the literature, affective influences are still often labeled as “affective biases.” Increasingly, however, psychologists see affect and cognition as interdependent rather than as at odds. In a paper on the “emotional controls of cognition,” Simon (1967) pointed out such interdependence, even as the cognitive revolution was being declared (Neisser, 1967). Since then, we have learned a good deal about how emotion exercises this control. In this chapter, we discuss the influence of mood on judgment, processing, and memory from the perspective of the affect-as-information hypothesis (e.g., Clore, 1992; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, & Clore, 1983, 1988, 1996).
