ABSTRACT

Both trust and epistemic responsibility are crucial to securing knowledge and other epistemic goods, yet there seems to be a tension between them. On the one hand, epistemic responsibility presumably involves attending to one’s evidence; on the other, trust seems to involve going beyond evidence. Grasswick’s chapter aims to show how epistemic trust can be epistemically responsible. In the broad-lens framework she sets up to make her case, Grasswick distinguishes two types of epistemic trust: trust in testimony and trust in inquiry, and in contrast to much of the current literature, she discusses not just epistemic trust for a one-off belief but also the development of epistemic-trust relationships that extend over time. This framework enables Grasswick to pinpoint three layers of epistemic responsibility that make for “healthy” relationships of epistemic trust: responsibility toward the evidence we have at a given time, responsibility in developing and maintaining communities of epistemic trust, and responsibility in critically evaluating the epistemic norms at play in our communities, for example, by listening to the epistemically marginalized who are not served well by them.