This chapter considers how a certain type of prejudicial speech—discriminatory speech that reflects social group stereotypes and represents group members as inferior by virtue of these stereotypes—hampers epistemic autonomy in eroding and perverting intellectual self-trust. Freedom of speech is a central liberal value. However, if left unchecked, it can engender morally problematic and socially undesirable expressions. Virulent hate speech can thus be legitimately regulated without compromising free expression. Nonetheless, discriminatory speech is legally protected (e.g. in the United States). Although this sort of speech is taken to be socially undesirable and harmful in some sense, liberal philosophers have argued for its legal permissibility on the grounds that its harmfulness is mitigable: discriminatory speech (the argument goes) still advances significant and compelling free speech interests due to which it deserves legal protection, despite being odious. The interests typically appealed to include the pursuit of truth and knowledge, ensuring democratic deliberation, and fostering personal autonomy and individual progress. By contrast, Mikkola argues that looking at how discriminatory speech seemingly influences us in deeply covert and hard-to-detect ways undermines liberal arguments that advance a “hands-off” policy to discriminatory speech. In short: intellectual self-trust is a necessary condition for the pursuit of knowledge and for fostering (personal and epistemic) autonomy; but because discriminatory speech erodes and perverts self-trust, it undermines in subtle, covert, and insidious ways the very grounds supposedly justifying its permissibility. This (Mikkola argues) becomes particularly clear once we appreciate how discriminatory expressions shape and maintain prejudicial unconscious influences. Rather than ban discriminatory speech, however, Mikkola advocates education to counter the pernicious stereotypes themselves.