ABSTRACT
In this chapter I draw comparisons between relativism and perspectivism, and between relativism and pluralism. I take the core of relativism as anti-absolutism, with its main characteristics as summarised by Martin Kusch. The relation between relativism and perspectivism is complex and multifaceted. Perspectivism taken to a deep level is virtually indistinguishable from epistemic relativism, though there are also layers of perspectivality that do not imply any strong relativism. Pluralism also has many different versions, and some of them differ significantly from relativism. Normative pluralism advocates plurality, while relativism merely tends to highlight any plurality that does exist. Interactive pluralism highlights the benefits of interaction between co-existing systems of practice, while relativism tends to downplay interaction. Relativism, perspectivism and pluralism converge significantly on two key issues in the philosophy of science: all three can support a modest kind of realism, and all of them, including relativism, allow some kind of judgement about the comparative epistemic merits of different systems.
