Why does the propensity to engage in the political process vary across fi rms? Existing research on corporate political strategy emphasizes the role of external or industry-level factors in explaining such differences – the concentration of fi rms within an industry, the costs of collective action (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971; Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1994), the existence of industry associations (Weymouth, 2010), the degree of public procurement (Masters and Keim, 1985), and the attractiveness of political markets, including the extent of interest group rivalry (Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim, 2005). To explain fi rm-level variations, however, recent literature has explored the idea that fi rms acquire or develop specifi c non-market resources or capabilities, which anchor their political activities (Dahan, 2005; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Bonardi, 2011).