ABSTRACT
Since the 1970s, theories of cognitive architecture have vacillated between two opposites: to caricature somewhat, hypotheses of non-modular cognitive architecture dominated the 1970s and 1980s; in contrast, the massive modularity hypothesis put forward by evolutionary psychologists played an important role in cognitive theorizing in the 1990s and early 2000s, while the recent rise of predictive coding represents a shift toward less modular theories of cognitive architecture. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the prospects of modular theories of cognitive architecture in light of what is perhaps the strongest objection that has been raised against them: that such theories cannot account for the plasticity that is characteristic of humans’ and other animals’ cognition. I will argue that while plasticity raises a challenge for the strongest modular theories, it also reveals that much of human cognition involves an interplay between modular systems and non-modular cognitive control: in effect, there can be no plasticity without modularity.
