What is the relation between ignorance and one or another kind of epistemic injustice? First, let us set out the core concepts of epistemic injustice that we shall be using: “testimonial injustice,” “hermeneutical injustice,” and its precondition “hermeneutical marginalization” (Fricker 2007). Testimonial injustice is the injustice of receiving a degree of credibility that has been reduced by some kind of prejudice. This kind of epistemic injustice consists in an unjust deficit of credibility. If a female politician’s policy proposal receives a reduced level of credibility from the electorate owing to gender prejudice, for instance, then she has been subject to a testimonial injustice. (Testimonial injustices need not strictly be in respect of testimonial speech acts, but rather any speech act whose acceptance depends on its receiving sufficient credibility; see Fricker 2007: 60.)