ABSTRACT
In one of the earliest studies on Malaysia’s foreign relations, scholar Peter Boyce (1968: 145) observed that relations with China were ‘the key point of reference’ for Malaysia’s foreign policy-makers. This observation was true throughout the early decades of Malay(si)a’s existence as a newly independent small state in a volatile international environment, struggling to battle the China-backed Malayan Communist Party (MCP) against the backdrop of the Cold War. Significantly, the observation has remained generally true to the present day. Although (or precisely because) the external and internal contexts have changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, China has remained a key point of reference for Malaysia’s external policy planners. This time, the reference has been cast in a largely positive light, as China has gradually emerged as a key economic and diplomatic partner since the early 1990s. Successive Malaysian leaders, from Mahathir Mohamad, to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, to present Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak, have all chosen to engage China at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Despite overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea between the two countries, Malaysia has accommodated and capitalised on China’s growing power, seeking to maximise commercial and geopolitical gains from the rising power while endeavouring to keep its long-term options open. Abdullah and Najib both chose China as their first country outside ASEAN to visit upon assuming the premiership in 2003 and 2009, respectively. Two weeks after his visit, Najib remarked in a key foreign policy speech that the trip was made ‘because our relationship with China is fundamental to our national interests, and because there are many mutual lessons to be learnt and shared between our countries’ (Najib 2009).
