ABSTRACT
Francois follows climate science closely, and on this basis she believes, correctly, that the earth’s mean temperature will continue to rise over the next century. Does she know this? Many would say that she does. Her belief is based on her accurate understanding of the scientific consensus, and we typically treat scientific expertise as a source of knowledge. On the other hand, you might deny that she knows that the temperature will continue to rise, even if you agree that this is likely. After all, climate scientists themselves readily acknowledge that their predictions are not entirely certain. So while Francois may be justified in her belief, she doesn’t really know. Which answer is right, then? Does Francois know? Or not? Contextualists think that which answer is correct depends, in part, on the context in which the question is asked. Whether Francois can truly claim to know depends on her context’s “epistemic standard,” which determines how strong her epistemic position must be in order for her to count as knowing in that context – how much evidence she needs, which alternatives she needs to be able to rule out, how reliable her belief-forming mechanisms need to be, and so on. So according to the contextualist, Francois can truly claim to know that the temperature will continue to rise in a context where the epistemic standard is relatively relaxed, but not in a context where the epistemic standard is particularly demanding.
