ABSTRACT
One of the perennial debates within the terrorism literature concerns whether counterterrorism should be understood as a police or military matter (Schmid, 1993). Advocates of a police model of counterterrorism have long argued that foiling the activities of covert cells of terrorists is a law enforcement task because only the police are equipped with legal and investigative powers needed to find, arrest and prosecute terrorists. Some governments strictly limit the ability to obtain warrants or to seize evidence to domestic law enforcement; others, such as the United States, forbid militaries from engaging in domestic law enforcement tasks outside of extreme natural disasters or emergencies. 1 Especially in cases where counterterrorism success is measured by successful criminal prosecution, the role of law enforcement remains paramount. Law enforcement also has a critical role in the prevention of terrorist attacks. Only police forces are capable of engaging in the kind of sustained presence and trust-building in local communities that is necessary for gathering intelligence about potential terrorist activities (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009). This presence – coupled with the legal right to investigate and build a case for prosecution – can exert a subtle deterrent effect and may stop terrorist attacks before they happen (Trager and Zagorcheva, 2005). For both of these reasons, policing remains an indispensable, if incomplete, part of the counterterrorism equation, especially when the terrorist threat takes the form of covert cells operating in well-developed or democratic societies.
