ABSTRACT
Ancient ethical theories are, as it is o en pointed out, agent-centred. Instead of explaining morality in terms of actions and their circumstances, ancient philosophers start with the agent, her dispositions and knowledge, and her ethical character (Annas 1981: 157-8). While it might be true that to recognize a just action is in some sense prior to recognizing a just agent, a just agent is something over and above the sum of her actions (or their consequences, for that matter). In one epistemological order of priority, actions may well come rst. From this it does not follow, however, that the causal-ontological order of priority would be the same. Quite the contrary, ancient philosophers think that in order to deeply understand – and to generate – just actions, we need to have a proper grasp of the thing that produces the actions, the agent. Action guidance calls for understanding which kinds of psychological outlook lead to which kinds of action. It is for this reason that character-formation is of utmost importance in eudaimonist ethics. You shape your life through improving your character, not primarily by concentrating on the qualities or consequences of your actions. e promoting of virtuous activity happens through promoting a virtuous soul. Yet the very same notion of character-formation brings the importance of actions right back to the picture: our characters are formed by our activities, by things we do, and by our choices and decisions to engage in certain things and refrain from others. e relationship between action and its causal origin becomes thereby complicated: it is a two-way street.
