ABSTRACT
A major contemporary problem that troubles characterizations of Neoplatonism is its hierarchical structure, a structure that, in the assessment of many critics, privileges human beings over other animals and plants, as well as mind, soul and rationality over body.1 is has been partially responsible for the domination of human interests over those of other species, on the one hand, and for the chimera of intrinsic goods based upon the categorical imperatives of rational duty and virtue, on the other.2 Human beings are intrinsic “goods” and have “rights” because they are rational and can make agreements. Other animals, by contrast, can make no rational agreements and are made to serve us. For Stoics and Epicureans, according to Porphyry’s account, “[w]e cannot act unjustly towards creatures which cannot act justly towards us” (Abst. 1.6.89, trans. G. Clark). Christian exegesis of Genesis 1:26 apparently just reinforced the pagan view that animals are made “for us”, just as masters should rule slaves, men should rule women and adults children (S. Clark 2011: 36).
