ABSTRACT
In the Platonic tradition, the role of matter as a possible source of evil is closely linked to earlier discussions on the subject, especially those of Plato and Aristotle.1 But there exists a fundamental di erence between the Neoplatonic treatment of this subject and its Classical sources, namely, the derivative character of matter. Indeed, beginning with Plotinus – and already before him in some other traditions such as Neopythagoreanism, gnosticism and the Chaldaean Oracles2 − matter is no longer an originative principle as was the case up to the Middle Platonism of Numenius, but an entity derived from another principle. From that point on, the classic opposition between Matter and Form, more or less acute depending on the author (but sometimes harshened to a form of radical dualism, as one can observe in Plutarch or Numenius), took on a di erent meaning, one which neither Plato nor Aristotle could have foreseen. Indeed, in the case where matter is a produced reality, the relationship between matter and form can be either one of relative cooperation, or one of relative opposition. But when matter and form each have an independent origin, any opposition between them tends to be seriously accentuated.
