ABSTRACT
A key feature of many debates in animal ethics is the distinction between ‘animal welfare’ and ‘animal rights’. According to prevailing thought, most theories of animal ethics can be assigned to one of two schools. Theories of animal welfare accept that sentient nonhuman animals have moral status; that is, that individuals with the capacity for consciousness and sensation are worthy of moral consideration in their own right. As a result of this status, these theories are claimed to argue that humans’ use of animals ought to be reformed, most commonly by restricting or eliminating the infliction of pain on the animals involved. Theories of animal rights, on the other hand, are argued to be much more radical. For what is said to distinguish animal rights positions is that they do not seek to regulate the use of animals in zoos, agriculture, laboratories, pet-keeping and so on; rather, they seek to abolish all such uses. According to this perspective, animal rights theories are those which call for the end of the human use, ownership and exploitation of animals (Francione 1996, 2000, 2008; Sztybel 1998). We can see, then, how this understanding of animal rights considers them to be analogous to human rights. For human rights do not demand that we regulate slavery, torture or human trafficking to make those practices more humane; instead, they demand that such forms of exploitation be abolished.
