It is reasonable to think that the problem of many hands (PMH) becomes more prevalent the larger the projects and activities in business and technology become. Some of the more recent examples are the bank crisis in 20082009 and the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010. In both cases, there were huge societal, economic, and environmental costs, respectively, but it was difficult to pinpoint individuals to hold responsible. This was due to the complexity of the cases and the complicated web of causalities and interdependencies that led to crisis and disaster. However, in both cases, there are also clear signs of irresponsible behaviour by individuals. Although PMH, like these ones, cannot be solved merely by responsible individual behaviour, agents who take responsibility would potentially reduce the risk of PMH. This is the notion I will defend in this chapter. As we will see, this requires not just virtuous individuals but also an institutional context that is conducive to responsibility-as-virtue.