ABSTRACT
Since mechanisms became a central topic in contemporary philosophy of science some 15 years ago, physics has never been in the focus of larger debates. Prima facie, this is understandable in the face of one major motivation for today’s mechanistic program: The traditional twentieth-century philosophy of science with its roots in logical empiricism was dominated by physics as the paradigmatic science. In physics, theories with universal laws seem to be center stage. They are the basis for predictions, explanations, and our general understanding of nature. However, this law-focused philosophy of science seems much less suited when it comes to special sciences such as biology, neuro-science, and psychology—leaving aside the question of whether it is appropriate for physics itself. In the special sciences, mechanisms play a far greater role than universal laws, if indeed there are any such laws at all. With the growing attention paid to special sciences in the philosophy of science, mechanisms have accordingly become a central issue. Today, with the ascent of the new mechanistic program in philosophy of science, the question has almost turned: How does physics fit into the picture?
