ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I argue that virtue epistemology is a branch of virtue ethics. One qualification to this thesis should immediately be mentioned. In their 2015 paper “Virtue Epistemology and Virtue Ethics,” Battaly and Slote note that “virtue epistemology” has differed from virtue ethics in admitting within its scope a “reliabilist” version according to which “virtue” just means a cognitive excellence. Virtue epistemology thus includes excellences that have nothing to do with character. My thesis will thus be restricted to those types of virtue epistemology in which “virtue” has its standard meaning of “virtue of character.” Such theories deal with a broad range of what are called intellectual virtues—such as (virtuous forms of) intellectual perseverance, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, curiosity, intellectual humility—and their relation to inquiry and its ends. Both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology understood in this way share a virtue-centered approach to excellent and right activity in the practical domain, in the latter case the practical domain of inquiry. But, I shall argue, virtue ethics should be seen as a very broad field not restricted to what has traditionally been described as the rather narrow field of the “moral.” Exactly how broad is this field is contentious, and is an issue I cannot explore in this chapter. 1 Virtue epistemology, by contrast, is concerned with excellent activity in relation to one important aspect of the practical, namely inquiry designed to result in knowledge and understanding. Hence on my view virtue epistemology is understood as a branch of virtue ethics rather than the other way round, even though (following Aristotle) I consider phronesis (an intellectual virtue) to be an essential and integral part of all virtues of character (see section 41.6).
