ABSTRACT
Virtue epistemology seeks to understand and promote the development of epistemic virtues; that is, capacities and character traits that constitute excellent epistemic agency. These include capacities of attention and discernment that allow agents to recognize and adapt their epistemic practice to the varying salient features of particular situations. For example, an attentive health care professional orders different lab work for patients presenting with similar symptoms when they are different ages or have different pre-existing conditions. However, conventional virtue epistemology (hereafter, “CVE”) does not recognize that the epistemically salient features of situations that vary from case to case include the socio-political status of and relations among involved epistemic agents. For that reason, it fails to engage with a dimension of the lived experience of individuals that shapes all aspects of their lives, including their epistemic lives. We will see that, as a result, CVE risks inaccurate generalizations and overlooks a body of questions about epistemic agency of pressing contemporary significance.
