ABSTRACT
Curiosity and inquisitiveness are subjects of emerging interest in contemporary epistemology. Curiosity, in particular, has attracted attention from epistemologists in recent years (Miščević 2007; Brady 2009; Whitcomb 2010; Inan 2012; Kvanvig 2012). This is notable given the limited attention paid to both curiosity and inquisitiveness in philosophical history. The most frequent (and more or less only) references to curiosity can be found in the context of early empiricism. Thomas Hobbes describes curiosity as the ‘lust of the mind’, comparing it (favorably) with base desires such as hunger and other sensory pleasures (Leviathan 1998: chapter 6, p. 35). John Locke projects an exalted view of curiosity, arguing that “[C]uriosity should be as carefully cherished . . . as other appetites suppressed” ( Some Thoughts Concerning Education 1989: section 108). David Hume concludes Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature (1986) with a discussion of curiosity, endorsing it as “the first source of all our enquiries” (section 2.3.10). The flattering light in which curiosity is presented within this Enlightenment context would suggest it a topic worthy of philosophical scrutiny. Yet, beyond these minimal comments, little has been said of curiosity. Inquisitiveness has received less attention still. Plausibly this is because curiosity and inquisitiveness have typically been regarded as synonymous. Given this, and the limited attention that curiosity has received, it is not surprising to find even fewer mentions of inquisitiveness in the philosophical canon. At any rate, neither curiosity nor inquisitiveness has been the subject of sustained philosophical investigation.
