ABSTRACT
At the end of the Cold War, globalization appeared on the world stage as a chimera of sorts, a three-headed fantastic beast with a lion’s front, a goat’s body, and a serpent as its tail. While the lion roared the promise of the final victory of capitalism and Western-style liberal democracy into the world (Fukuyama 1989; Ohmae 1990) – conjuring up a new era of unimpeded flows of goods, capital, and people – critics were quick to point to the creature’s ordinary body and its dangerous serpent tail. Ever since, observers have argued that the promise of globalization was uneven at best, place became no less important, and borders were clearly not disappearing (Brenner 1997, 1999; Cox 1997; Dirlik 1997, 2011; Cunningham and Heyman 2004; Heyman et al. 2004; Gainsborough 2007; Cunningham 2009; Mezzardra and Neilson 2013; Jones 2016).
