ABSTRACT
According to one prominent analysis of discrimination, a necessary condition of discrimination is membership of a social group. Andrew Altman proposes that persons suffer discrimination as members of social groups and that the differential treatment that constitutes discrimination must be treatment ‘relative to some appropriate comparison social group’ (Altman 2015). Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen argues that differential treatment must be ‘suitably explained’ as making a distinction between members of ‘different, socially salient groups’ (Lippert-Rasmussen 2006: 168; Chapter 1). 1 The social group condition ‘explains why we do not talk about discrimination against non-family-members, unqualified applicants or the undeserving’ (Lippert-Rasmussen 2006: 169). ‘Non-family members’ and ‘unqualified persons’ do not correspond to salient social groups and therefore on this conception differential treatment with respect to these categories cannot constitute discrimination. On an alternative conception of discrimination, membership of a social group is not conceptually required for discrimination. Benjamin Eidelson argues that employment practices based on hair color or eye color (for instance) would be discriminatory even if there were no salient social groups constituted by people with a particular hair color or eye color (Eidelson 2015: 29). For Eidelson, wrongful discrimination is treatment that disrespects ‘different attributes of personhood’ such as intrinsic equal value or autonomy (Eidelson 2015: 8).
