ABSTRACT
For some time now, moral and political philosophers have debated the ethics of immigration. These debates have focused on a wide array of issues that come up when discussing the topic of immigration. Central to this debate has been the question of whether a political community has the presumptive right to exclude non-members who wish to join the community or if commitments to liberal principles—such as universal equality or individual freedom—give immigrants a presumptive right to enter any and all political communities they choose. Keeping in mind that the rights under consideration are mainly thought to be presumptive (meaning that under certain circumstances they can be defeated), a corollary question that has naturally followed from these discussions has been when, or should, these rights be superseded? In response to this question, it has been suggested, both in defense and opposition to immigration, that such overriding situations may include the cases of refugees, natural calamities (e.g., natural disasters or threats of overpopulation), threats of chaos (e.g., terrorism, drug cartels, or social mistrust), and even economic interests (both at the national and international level).
