ABSTRACT
Evil and forgiveness share a short history in contemporary philosophy. Although one can find philosophical works in any era in which each is occasionally addressed, the past 25 years offer more literature on either topic than do many centuries combined. A happy consequence of increased attention to both moral phenomena is a rich literature, and, inevitably, another consequence is a variety of interpretations of evil and of forgiveness. A cluster of related questions recur in philosophical discussions of forgiving evils. In this essay, I start with discussion, and the eventual rejection, of the conception of evil as that which is unforgivable. Once that definitional stop is out of the way, it is easier to consider related issues at the intersection of evil and forgiveness. My treatment of contentious issues is influenced by my interest in empirically informed approaches to moral theory, the better to take seriously the experiences of survivors of evils. I draw upon nonideal and feminist theorists as I argue that the material actualities of occasions for forgiveness of evil should direct and constrain our theorizing about forgiveness.
