ABSTRACT
The word “evil” evokes a range of different reactions. To some people it conjures up a comic book world in which superheroes use their powers for good, not evil, and in which stylized villains erupt with maniacal laughter when contemplating their self-consciously evil deeds. Yet the word “evil” is not merely a joke or a theatrical convention. Many of us reach for this word when we are confronted with the most horrendous wartime atrocities and acts of terrorism, or when we read about the actions of a torturer or a serial killer. In these contexts, when we seek to convey a sense of somber moral gravity, “evil” seems to fit the bill. But what is evil? How does the judgment that something is evil differ from the judgment that something is bad or wrong? In recent years a philosophical dispute has arisen in response to these questions. In this chapter I survey and assess various attempts to define evil actions, and reflect on the nature of this task.
