In Th e Cultural Politics of Emotion, Ahmed argues that a ect’s denigration in the history of philosophy makes it all the more immanently important to the history of philosophy. e fact that European and US philosophers have o en ignored the body and the emotional life of ‘the Subject’ does not mean that bodies and emotional lives are missing from philosophy; what it means instead is that the embodiments and a ective belongings of European and US philosophers have most o en own under the radar of what we think is worth thinking – is worthy of thought. In the simplest terms, what established philosophers care about is what counts as philosophy, and what counts as philosophy is what established philosophers care about, and this caring can never enter the philosophical

re ection on what counts as philosophy. ere is, of course, a circularity to this caring about certain kinds of philosophical pursuits, to policing the boundaries of these pursuits and to being deemed a philosopher for engaging in these pursuits and this policing.