ABSTRACT
My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that UK governments since 1969 have consistently fallen into a trap set for them by a variety of non-state actors who have chosen to adopt the tactics of terrorism and political violence to further their political aims. This is to conceive terrorism as a tactic intended to provoke overreaction by governments that will harm communities where the terrorists seek recruits and supporters. It would conceivably pay to be tough on terrorism, but by failing to keep counter-terrorism policies tightly focused on lawfully targeting legitimate terrorist suspects, and instead invoking extrajudicial and ‘emergency’ measures that have too often harmed, alienated and criminalised minority communities, governments have routinely invoked counter-terrorism practices that have become counter-productive. Counter-productivity does not follow simply because counter-terrorism policies have been too tough, but rather because they have been poorly focused and have sought military and extrajudicial means instead of normal investigative responses led by the police.
