ABSTRACT
In a European union (Eu) of 27+ member states, it is essential to question the capacity for leadership to drive the integration process forward in the twenty-first century. In this context, is it possible to create a negotiation space in which as many members as possible can identify their interests in agreements that address the objectives these different states want to achieve (guérot2004, 285-98; Mazzucelli et al. 2007, 158-77)? The Eu is a complex and dense network of relationships among institutions and member states, regional governments and interest groups. Policy areas like the single internal market, economic and monetary union (EMu) or global trade and external relations have distinct supranational features. In these
areas, the role of the European institutions in policy-making is defined by the successive reforms of the original Treaty of Rome, particularly the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European union. despite these reforms, including the Lisbon Treaty, should that document come into force, European foreign policy remains intergovernmental. Member states’ insistence on the use of the veto means that the Eu cannot move beyond the classical nature of international organisations in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The tensions between the supranational and intergovernmental features of the Eu are increasingly evident in areas of internal security. The absence of borders inside the Eu’s territory calls for more integration in internal security among the member states to combat transnational criminal activities, especially terrorism.
