Faced with assessments as damning as these, some readers will conclude that the days of Heidegger being considered a legitimate reference for the philosophy of technology are over. Others will be less rash and conclude that philosophy of technology readers would benet from a fresh close reading of Heidegger. is will be particularly true of those who are familiar with Heidegger’s corpus. For they will know that his philosophy of technology is part of a larger ‘thoughtway’ (Denkweg) and suspect that much of the criticism he has received in recent commentaries reects a failure to see his comments on technology in their proper context. ese same readers may also sense that developments in technology since Heidegger’s time have not so much diminished the relevance and importance of his views as given them added urgency. What will have convinced them of this more than anything else is the role played by technology

in aggravating humankind’s already poor relations with nature and thereby the material conditions of possibility of its own existence. Why, they will wonder, is so little credit given to the philosophy of technology of a thinker who seeks not just to stop this tendency but to actually make technology an interface for a positive and even a soteriological relationship with nature?