Some, but not all, criminological theories possess notions of human agency. Those criminologists who support the usefulness of the rational choice perspective (RCP) note that it has a unique role to play with regards to its notions of human agency (sometimes viewed as thoughtfully reflective decision-making) and that this clearly defines its utility with regards to understanding criminal behaviour. There are others, however, who would disagree – noting that the assumptions that underpin RCP are implausible and, as such, RCP is unnecessary. Moreover, RCP should be abandoned in favour of alternative situational theories and perspectives as the primary theoretical foundation of situational crime prevention, as it is inhibiting research and practice. In this chapter, I argue that RCP should be preserved and adapted based on what we find in our experiments. I acknowledge the limitations noting that rational choice should not be used as a detailed and accurate description of human behaviour – or in the context of crime, how offenders actually make decisions. Rather, its purpose should be more pragmatic, where its utility for determining a baseline of ‘normal behaviour’ and how individuals deviate from this is more applicable. Specifically, I show how the outcomes of simple deterrence mechanisms (through civil and legal levers) provide a useful baseline for those scientists investigating deviation from the norm.